Wal-Mart Ethics

In 2007, Walmart reported net sales in the third quarter of $90,000,000,000.

One of their associates (employees) suffered a tragic automobile accident from which she lost her short term memory. Since then her son died in Iraq. Every time she asks about him and is told he was killed she weeps with the anguish of being told for the first time her son is dead.

Although Wal-Mart was notified of a settlement in her case against the other driver, it did not demand any of the almost $500,000 in medical bills paid by its medical insurance. The net settlement to her was far less than her medical bills. Years later it decided to sue its employee to get the money she received. The medical payments were made because it's employee paid premiums but Walmart insisted on a provision that it would get its money back regardless of how badly their employee was hurt or how small the settlement was compared to her injuries.

Wal-Mart spokesman John Simley, who called Debbie Shank's case "unbelievably sad," replied in a statement: "Wal-Mart's plan is bound by very specific rules. ... We wish it could be more flexible in Mrs. Shank's case since her circumstances are clearly extraordinary, but this is done out of fairness to all associates who contribute to, and benefit from, the plan."

Mr. Simley expresses concern for the other associates if this poor woman is given a break. My guess is that if it asked all the associates to pitch in less than a dollar to avoid this terrible action, everyone would agree. The "very specific rules" to which Mr. Simley refers are Walmart Rules and, therefore, can be changed by Walmart in the face of human tragedy. Unfortunately Walmart does not have a department of conscious down the hall from its legal department.

http://www.bailey-law.com/lawyer-attorney-1215790.html

 

Driver license

Driver’s Licenses for Illegal Aliens
The Federal Government hasn’t provided an immigration program capable of supplying the labor our economy has needed. The net result has been 12 to 20 million illegal immigrates, sometimes encouraged by employers who enjoy the use of invisible labor without the responsibility of safe working conditions or minimal wages. There is no chance in foreseeable future that these immigrants are going to be rounded up and sent away or provided a route to citizenship. Now many think that issuing a drivers license to them should not be done because it is a privilege. I disagree. Until our Federal Government gets around to a meaningful solution, we need to register these invisible people by issuing driver’s licenses. This will allow us to see if they can pass a written (English) test; pass the driving exam; and prove possession of liability insurance. Anyone driving on our roads needs to be known and exercise financial responsibility and competence—illegal or not.

Medicare corruption

The private drama of families seeking treatment is a daily experiece for a plaintiff's trial lawyer such as myself. Delays in paying legitimate claims can destroy a family. Insurance companies, motivated by profit, can be ruthless. Even delays of a few days can work havoc on an injured person's ability to get timely treatment or be able to keep a job. Compound this ruthless motivation for profit many times if President Bush gets his way by converting medicare to a for-profit cartel with little or no checks and balances. The following is part of a recent New York Times article that clearly demonstrates the travesty of Bush's for-profit gift for his chronies. Do not confuse this effort with free enterprise because the natural checks and balances of an open market.

By ROBERT PEAR
Published: October 7, 2007
WASHINGTON, Oct. 6 — Tens of thousands of Medicare recipients have been victims of deceptive sales tactics and had claims improperly denied by private insurers that run the system’s huge new drug benefit program and offer other private insurance options encouraged by the Bush administration, a review of scores of federal audits has found.

Paul Vernon/Associated Press
Michael O. Leavitt, the secretary of health and human services, says the Medicare drug benefit is saving people money.
The problems, described in 91 audit reports reviewed by The New York Times, include the improper termination of coverage for people with H.I.V. and AIDS, huge backlogs of claims and complaints, and a failure to answer telephone calls from consumers, doctors and drugstores.

Medicare officials have required insurance companies of all sizes to fix the violations by adopting “corrective action plans.” Since March, Medicare has imposed fines of more than $770,000 on 11 companies for marketing violations and failure to provide timely notice to beneficiaries about changes in costs and benefits.

The companies include three of the largest participants in the Medicare market, UnitedHealth, Humana and WellPoint.

The sad end to this story is that there will be no real solution until the sheppards and wolves are not the same

Attempted judicial coup

In the last session of the Texas Legislature our Supreme Court pushed for authority to send a judge of its choice to any jurisdiction in Texas if it determined that there was a case of  "complex litigation". This action would be without the consent of the local judge. For this reason, unprecedented power would be given to judges in Austin to usurp the power of our locally elected judges in cases of importance. Once again, the powers with the money to elect state-wide supreme court judges, (the insurance industry), would increase their advantage on our local courts and the determinations of conflicts among local parties. Trial judges; the Texas Trial Lawyers Association: the Texas Association of Defense Counsel; and the American Board of Trial Advocates came out against this unusual and scary proposal. The Texas Legislature overwhelmingly rejected the legislation. Once again the power play raises its ugly head as the judges on our Supreme Court try to gain this power through the back door as reflected below:

“Based on discussions with Justice Hecht, Chip Babcock, as Chair of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, has asked our Subcommittee to develop a proposed rule for dealing with ‘complex cases.’ As you may be aware, the Texas Legislature considered such a proposal as part of Senate Bill 1204 during the recent 80th Legislative Session, but that bill did not pass. The Court would now like to consider alternatives for enacting such a proposal as a Court rule, in the absence of a legislative mandate.”

FBI and insurance

According to a July 11, 2007 MSNBC report the FBI is gathering and sorting information about Americans to help search for terrorists and “fake car accident insurance claims”. How powerful has the insurance industry become that it can enlist the country’s top law enforcement agency to defend car accident claims? Why don't we have the insurance industry on the terror list for delaying or denying legitimate claims for citizens who can't afford to go to the doctor or get their car fixed?

Someone needs to tell the federal government that the crisis in the court system has to do with abuse of insurance and not the injured. http://www.bailey-law.com/lawyer-attorney-1215835.html

 

Permissive use


ANALYSIS PERMISSIVE USE

Under Texas law, a person who deviates from the permitted use of a car will still be covered under insurance policy if the deviation is minor or immaterial. Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Renfrow, 130 S.W.3d 70, 73 (Tex. 2004). The factors to be considered while determining whether the deviation was minor or material are “extent of deviation and actual distance or time”… “purposes for which vehicle was given and other factors”. Id. at 72. If permission to given to a person to use a car, he may use the car for the purpose the car is given to him, and he is not excluded from insurance coverage because of a minor deviation from the purpose the car is given. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 471 S.W.2d 620, 624 (Tex. App. 1971). When a person has permission to use a vehicle and if the person uses the vehicle with minor deviations, it is still considered to have been done with permission. Coronado v. Employees Nat. Ins. Co., 577 S.W. 2d 525, 529 (Tex. App. 1979), aff’d 596 S.W.2d (Tex. 1979). If a car owner does not object to the use of the car by another person, such non-objection may be considered as implied consent to use of the car. United Services Auto. Ass’n v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. App. 1980). Whether consent is given for the use of the car may be inferred from the circumstances of the case, relationship between the parties and from the lack of objection by the owner of the car for use of the car. Tristan v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 489 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. App. 1972); Royal Idem. Co. v. H.E. Abbott & Sons, Inc., 399 S.W. 2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1966), rev’g 392 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App. Austin 1965).

In Truck Ins. Exch. v. Ballard, 343 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App. 1961), an individual was employed as an automobile salesman to sell new and used cars. Id. at 954. The first day he reported for work, he took a used car and while driving the car had an accident. Id. The individual was neither given permission to take the used car nor had been denied such permission. Id. The individual testified that, since he had a prospective purchaser for a used car, he took the car to determine whether it was suitable for sale and to go to his home for lunch. Id. The court noted that an employee can act within the scope of his employment, although he is at the same time accomplishing his own purpose. Id. The court held that since evidence demonstrated that he was driving the car to test it in furtherance of his employment and the fact that he joined with such purpose some of his private business, i.e., going to lunch, would be immaterial and the appellee is covered under insurance policy as employee. Id. at 956.

In United Serv. Auto. Ass’n v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App. 1980), the insured left the vehicles for sale, the sales manager, during the course of his employment, was expected to show the vehicles to prospective purchasers and the prospective purchasers were expected to drive the vehicles before buying. Id. at 956. The court held that since at the time of the accident the prospective purchaser’s daughter was driving the vehicle and the prospective purchaser was seated in the front seat of the vehicle, it is sufficient to support a finding that the prospective purchaser and his daughter, even though an unlicensed driver, were using the vehicle with implied consent of the insured at time of accident. Id. at 959.

In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Behringer, 419 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. App. 1967), Aiken lived in the home of Pepper’s parents. Id. at 652. Aiken was Pepper’s boyfriend, he went on dates using her car. He had driven her car by himself when he wanted to go to the store to get things for Pepper, her family and also for himself and Pepper never objected to the use of the car by Aiken. Id. 652. On the day of the accident, a kid asked Aiken to take him for a ride in the car. Id. Pepper told Aiken that he should not take the car for a drive; however, Aiken did not listen to Pepper and took the kid for a drive in the car. Id. Pepper made no effort to take the keys away from Aiken and made no further effort to stop Aiken. Id. at 653. When they went for drive Aiken meet with an accident. Id. The court held that since Aiken always uses Pepper’s car and Pepper in that instant did not make any effort to prevent Aiken from taking the car for drive, Aiken was driving the car with the permission of Pepper. Id. This case seems quite similar to the present. The dealer knew that Phillips drove the car on unapproved trips. They did nothing to stop him. Behringer, 419 S.W.2d at 653.

In Tull v. Chubb Group of Ins. Companies, 146 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App. 2004), Shaffer was driving a pickup truck owned by her employer. Id. at 691. Shaffer during the accident was not at work for her employer but was with her boyfriend. Id. Following the accident, Shaffer was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated. Id. The court held that Shaffer’s use of the truck while being intoxicated and after office hours, which resulted in collision, was a material deviation from her permitted use of the truck. Id. at 696. In Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Renfrow, 130 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2004), rev’g 90 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App. Ft. Worth 2002), the employee used the company vehicle after work to visit his friend and took her with him to a location which is 40 miles from employer’s office. Id. at 71. The court held that the employee materially deviated from the permission granted by the employer for the use of the company vehicle and was thus not covered under employer’s commercial auto liability policy. Id. at 72.

Knowledge of an agent can be imputed to the principal. Poth v. Small, Craig & Workenthin, L.L.P., 967 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex. App. Austin 1998) citing Wellington Oil Co. v. Maffi, 150 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Texas 1941). It therefore seems reasonable that the dealer’s employees’ knowledge of Phillips’ deviations can be imputed to the dealership. Poth, 967 S.W.2d at 515. A minor deviation such as driving the car in a different direction then the owner’s address, is immaterial for the purpose of insurance coverage. See Coronado, 577 S.W.2d at 529. Moreover, the deviation appears to be “minor” if the actual distance and the time the car was taken was not long enough to term the deviation material. Cf. Tull, 146 S.W.3d 689; Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 130 S.W.3d 70. If an agent drove the car for doing his job and joined with such purpose some private business it would not amount to deviation and the accident would still be covered under insurance policy. See Truck Ins. Exch. 343 S.W.2d at 956.

FBI

According to a July 11, 2007 MSNBC report the FBI is gathering and sorting information about Americans to help search for terrorists and “fake car accident insurance claims”. How powerful has the insurance industry become that it can enlist the country’s top law enforcement agency to defend car accident claims? Why don't we have the insurance industry on the terror list for delaying or denying legitimate claims for citizens who can't afford to go to the doctor or get their car fixed?

Perry's veto against fairness

Our good governor vetoed a bill that restored fairness and cured confusion in our court system. Texas Watch, a non-profit consumer group released the following press release, voicing its disgust. I second that sentiment.

LEGISLATION TO PROTECT POLICYHOLDERS VETOED BY GOVERNOR
HB 3281 Passed Legislature with Overwhelming Bipartisan Support

AUSTIN – Governor Rick Perry bowed to the wishes of a few special interest lobbyists and the insurance industry by vetoing HB 3281 by Rep. Phil King.

“HB 3281 would have restored fairness for responsible policyholders that are injured by reckless, irresponsible, and drunk drivers,” said Alex Winslow, Executive Director of Texas Watch, a statewide consumer advocacy organization active on insurance issues. “Instead of siding with responsible policyholders, Governor Perry bowed to the wishes of insurance companies that want to pad their bottom line.”

HB 3281 was designed to clarify current law. The current statute, adopted in 2003 as part of the sweeping so-called tort “reform” measure known as HB 4, is ambiguous and has been the subject of ongoing controversy.

In opposing HB 3281, insurance companies are asserting that reckless drivers who cause death and injury should be allowed to unfairly benefit from a responsible policyholder’s decision to carry health insurance. Insurance companies are simply seeking to reap windfall profits by requiring innocent families to subsidize the cost of their injuries.

By vetoing this legislation, Governor Perry guarantees this issue will continue to be disputed in the courts, increasing litigation expenses, padding the insurance industry’s bottom line, and making justice harder to come by for hard working Texas families.

“By vetoing this legislation, the governor is sending the message that personal responsibility is not as important as insurance industry profits,” said Winslow.

This legislation passed with overwhelming bipartisan support. Not a single dissenting vote was cast in the House of Representatives (139-0; RV 1140, 5/9/07) and just two Senators registered opposition (28-2; SJ 2238, 5/17/07).

Medical malpractice bunk

I am a personal injury trial lawyer in Texas. My client’s access to the courts and their ability to fight large corporate interests, including insurance companies, depends upon their ability to contract with me on a contingent basis. In other words I don’t get paid unless I win their lawsuit. From a pure economic reason I have always been reluctant to take on an expensive, complicated case unless I determine it has strong merits. This has always been the case in medical negligence cases since they are time-consuming and will demand large amounts of cash outlay.

Sometimes insurance companies argue that they are put in a hot spot if the injured patient makes an offer because they fear that a jury might give much more than the case is worth. The reverse has been my experience. Defendants normally win their cases and juries are much more likely to award a conservative amount than an excessive one. Many times good cases settle for less than their value because the injured patients are less able to afford the risk of trial than a large insurance company.

I decided to represent injured parties who need a champion in the court room because it seemed to be such a noble cause. I also felt I could do a public good by acting as a check and balance to encourage reasonably safe products, prudent conduct on the roads and workplace and conscientious professionals. Certainly formidable interests such as insurance can afford political gravity and advertisement to sway the public regardless of the facts, but trial by jury I felt should be the great equalizer.

Some argue that special protection for medical providers is necessary to avoid a diminishing of the doctors needed for our care and outrageous medical costs. But on what could anyone exercising intellectual integrity base such an outlandish claim?

There is no creditable national study showing a decrease in doctors. The doctor population is increasing impressively. According to the 2004 AMA report, the number of physicians practicing in the U.S. grew 203% from 1965 to 2003—four times faster than the population growth. The number of high risk practices grew dramatically during the same time period. Applications for residency training positions by medical school seniors hit a 20 year high in 2006 according to an American Association of Medical Colleges’ press release.

President Bush said in a speech in 2004 that lawsuits were “driving docs out of business,” yet it is undisputed that malpractice costs amount to only .0062 of our nation’s health care costs, (less than 2/3’s of a penny of a health care dollar). Ironically, the insurance industry tries to prove there is a crisis by citing the huge premiums it charges doctors and hospitals without any statistical basis justifying their rates. Historically, states that pass “tort reform,” including Texas, have not been rewarded by lower insurance premiums.

President Bush’s own Mark McClellan, (appointed by the President to head the Food and Drug Administration), wrote an article postulating that doctors practice “defensive medicine” which drives up health care costs. This theory was necessary since less than 2/3’s of a penny of the health care dollar could not justify taking away victims’ rights. It is interesting to note that McClellan’s report stands alone and the Congressional Budget Office and Government Accountability Office dismiss the theory and refuse to take it into account for making cost estimates.

I suppose the insulation industry practices “defensive installation” by not using asbestos and Ford Motor Company practices “defensive auto design” by moving the Pinto’s exploding gas tank because of lawsuits seeking damages to our citizens; but I don’t necessarily think that such fear of being brought to task is a bad thing.

My opinion is shared in the May 11, 2006 issue of the New England of Medicine by George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.: “And more liability suits against hospitals may be necessary to motivate hospital boards to take patient safety more seriously.” In the same issue a study entitled Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, concluded payments of claims found by the study not involving error occurred less frequently than non-payments for claims involving error. Claims the study found not involving error caused 13%-16% of the total monetary cost of defense.

The lack of economic impact of medical negligence cases is not a new revelation. Harvard Medical School ran an extensive study in 1990 and determined that only a very small percent of negligence causing injury to a hospital patient in New York State resulted in any recovery. It found that 8 times more patients suffered injury or death from negligence than filed a lawsuit and 16 times more patients suffered injury or death from negligence than received compensation.

Texas has been no exception to the national experience. The Tonn study in 1992, financed by the Texas Trial Lawyers Association, Texas Medical Association and the Texas Hospital Association, finding there to be no medical malpractice crisis, (“. . . changing the medical professional liability system will have minimal cost savings impact on the overall health care delivery system in Texas”).

Most recently, a study reported in the July, 2005 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies entitled Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, concluded that there was an overall picture of stability which did not justify legal reform in Texas.

Texas malpractice legislation is a classic example of power over reason, castrating the protection of Article I Sec 3 of our state constitution mandating that no individual or group of individuals be allowed special rights or privileges over other citizens and Article I Sec 15 guaranteeing the right to trial by jury.

Texas, as in other jurisdictions, tries to make a victim whole by allowing money damages if it is found that a doctor or hospital breached the recognized standard of care and foreseeably caused injury to the patient. The damages allowed in a medical negligence case are the same for which each of us is accountable if we negligently hurt someone, such as in an automobile accident.

One category of damages is economic. It can be figured by an accountant gathering some data and making projections of earnings, or earning capacity, and medical expenses.

The other category is “human damages,” or, as the insurance industry wants to call them, “non-economic loss”. Human damages are pain, anguish, disfigurement, physical impairment or the loss of a relationship with a close family member killed or profoundly injured. Under the current malpractice law in Texas this is capped at $250,000 in almost all cases. This cap doesn’t stop frivolous lawsuits. Its effect is on the meritorious ones with overwhelming human damages. The net good is for the insurance industry.

Some argue that money can’t replace quality of life and should not be considered. Yet compensation for the cost of burying your child wrongfully killed, and nothing else, does not meet the sense of justice that courts should provide. Certainly the right to trial by jury should not be inhibited without compelling state or national interests. Where is the evidence that there is a crisis that justifies this attack on our civil justice system? Why should doctors and hospitals be afforded more protection than the rest of us?

Statistics show the disingenuous nature of the lawmakers, but it is the individual examples that explain the impact of the wrong. True life examples such as a child transformed into a rag doll due to septic shock resulting from untreated infection at an IV site; a woman who loses her arm because of an inappropriate administration of Phenergan; and a mentally disabled woman raped by a nurse’s assistant in a nursing home, are limited to a minimal recovery because of the preponderance of human damages.

If a new medical malpractice client came into my office and I determined she was one of the people who deserved a day in court, I would have to hire an expert in the same field of expertise as the defendant and provide 60 day notice before even being allowed to file a lawsuit or conduct discovery. After a lawsuit is filed I must provide a detailed expert report within 120 days from the date of filing, armed with a maximum of two depositions. Peer review at a hospital of a negligent act of a doctor—regardless of how egregious—is forever secret. The doctor or hospital will automatically have colleagues who will assist in the defense. My fees and expenses must come out of the victim’s recovery and can not be mentioned to the jury.

The professionals being driven out of the arena are not the doctors but competent attorneys who have the ability to represent someone injured in a sophisticated case. Many of my fellow attorneys refuse to look at any case if it is post tort reform medical malpractice case. Although I never have carried a large medical negligence case load, currently I have none.

Do the vast majority of doctors who practice competently and ethically really want the last vestige of check and balance taken out of the system? The Texas Board of Medical Examiners is at best lax in weeding out the doctors who should not be practicing. Of doctors in Texas found to have provided substandard care, incompetence or negligence, 3% received a revocation or suspension of their license according to a July 2002 press release by consumer watch dog, Public Citizen. It also reported that some Texas doctors committing bizarre violations such as writing prescriptions for sexual favors were allowed to keep their licenses.

In the 2003 campaign causing the passage of the Texas medical malpractice tort reform, insurance campaigners promised a 17% to 19% reduction in premium costs. What wasn’t pointed out was profits of the insurance companies went up 225% between 2002 and 2003. After its passage Governor Perry bragged about Texas Medial Liability Trust reducing its premiums 12% but neglected to mention the previous 140% increases it pushed past the Texas insurance commissioner.

The function of insurance premiums is dependent on investments the insurance companies are making and the political power they have with the state insurance commissioners. The effect of law suits comes in a poor third. The insurance commissioner in Texas has been a cash cow for the industry and has no idea about what numbers support its premiums. Call him up, (1-512-462-6169), and ask.

After the passage of medical malpractice caps the various insurance companies attempted to raise their rates again, flying in the face of their promise for a premium reduction if the measure passed. The Texas Medical Liability Insurance Underwriting Association sought a 35.6% increase and GE Medical Protective filed for a 39% increase. It wasn’t until after the new president of the Texas Medical Association, Bohn Allen; Dan Gattis, a Republican from Georgetown and vice chairman of the House Civil Practices Committee, (its “not a win for our doctors”); Dan Lambe of Texas Watch, (“Rates are higher, health care costs are up . . and the only beneficiaries are the special interests who bankrolled the campaign. …”); and others raised unmitigated hell, did premiums get reduced marginally. The appearance of reduction was helped by taking some of the coverage off the table with such things as “risk purchasing groups.” If you talk to Texas doctors, they will probably tell you their premiums went down all right, but so did their coverage. Be assured that the rates will rise once the furor is over.

Now the federal politicians have been persuaded by doctor, hospital and insurance groups to violate the equal protection and right to trial by jury provisions of the 7th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution by preempting what is left of rights of injured patients in favor of doctors and hospitals. That’s the bad news. The good news is that patient rights have been so devastated in Texas by state law; there isn’t really anything else that can be done to hurt a victim of medical negligence by federal pre-emption.

Trial by jury is the American right Thomas Jefferson held in higher esteem than the right to vote. It is a right that exists only if there is a sense of fairness for all who come to our courts to be heard. Courts resolving issues of human suffering must be given the power to grant justice for all individuals and not just for the powerful.

Finding insurance for permissive user


When analyzing a potential claim, we must always look at the "big four":

  1. Breach of duty
  2. Foreseeable causation
  3. Damages
  4. Ability to pay (insurance)

Many times the forth consideration just isn't there when one otherwise has a perfect case.  Sometimes lawyers overlook insurance that follows the auto because the driver isn't following the guidelines of its owner.  What happens if a contractor sent to clean up a dealership car uses it for personal reasons?  Can he be covered under the large corporate umbrella policy? It takes little time to dream up many scenarios.  Here is my take on the law: 

Under Texas law, a person who deviates from the permitted use of a car will still be covered under insurance policy if the deviation is minor or immaterial. Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Renfrow, 130 S.W.3d 70, 73 (Tex. 2004). The factors to be considered while determining whether the deviation was minor or material are “extent of deviation and actual distance or time”… “purposes for which vehicle was given and other factors”. Id. at 72. If permission to given to a person to use a car, he may use the car for the purpose the car is given to him, and he is not excluded from insurance coverage because of a minor deviation from the purpose the car is given. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 471 S.W.2d 620, 624 (Tex. App. 1971). When a person has permission to use a vehicle and if the person uses the vehicle with minor deviations, it is still considered to have been done with permission. Coronado v. Employees Nat. Ins. Co., 577 S.W. 2d 525, 529 (Tex. App. 1979), aff’d 596 S.W.2d (Tex. 1979). If a car owner does not object to the use of the car by another person, such non-objection may be considered as implied consent to use of the car. United Services Auto. Ass’n v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. App. 1980). Whether consent is given for the use of the car may be inferred from the circumstances of the case, relationship between the parties and from the lack of objection by the owner of the car for use of the car. Tristan v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 489 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. App. 1972); Royal Idem. Co. v. H.E. Abbott & Sons, Inc., 399 S.W. 2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1966), rev’g 392 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App. Austin 1965).

In Truck Ins. Exch. v. Ballard, 343 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App. 1961), an individual was employed as an automobile salesman to sell new and used cars. Id. at 954. The first day he reported for work, he took a used car and while driving the car had an accident. Id. The individual was neither given permission to take the used car nor had been denied such permission. Id. The individual testified that, since he had a prospective purchaser for a used car, he took the car to determine whether it was suitable for sale and to go to his home for lunch. Id. The court noted that an employee can act within the scope of his employment, although he is at the same time accomplishing his own purpose. Id. The court held that since evidence demonstrated that he was driving the car to test it in furtherance of his employment and the fact that he joined with such purpose some of his private business, i.e., going to lunch, would be immaterial and the appellee is covered under insurance policy as employee. Id. at 956.

In United Serv. Auto. Ass’n v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App. 1980), the insured left the vehicles for sale, the sales manager, during the course of his employment, was expected to show the vehicles to prospective purchasers and the prospective purchasers were expected to drive the vehicles before buying. Id. at 956. The court held that since at the time of the accident the prospective purchaser’s daughter was driving the vehicle and the prospective purchaser was seated in the front seat of the vehicle, it is sufficient to support a finding that the prospective purchaser and his daughter, even though an unlicensed driver, were using the vehicle with implied consent of the insured at time of accident. Id. at 959.

In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Behringer, 419 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. App. 1967), Aiken lived in the home of Pepper’s parents. Id. at 652. Aiken was Pepper’s boyfriend, he went on dates using her car. He had driven her car by himself when he wanted to go to the store to get things for Pepper, her family and also for himself and Pepper never objected to the use of the car by Aiken. Id. 652. On the day of the accident, a kid asked Aiken to take him for a ride in the car. Id. Pepper told Aiken that he should not take the car for a drive; however, Aiken did not listen to Pepper and took the kid for a drive in the car. Id. Pepper made no effort to take the keys away from Aiken and made no further effort to stop Aiken. Id. at 653. When they went for drive Aiken meet with an accident. Id. The court held that since Aiken always uses Pepper’s car and Pepper in that instant did not make any effort to prevent Aiken from taking the car for drive, Aiken was driving the car with the permission of Pepper. Id. This case seems quite similar to the present. The dealer knew that Phillips drove the car on unapproved trips. They did nothing to stop him. Behringer, 419 S.W.2d at 653.

In Tull v. Chubb Group of Ins. Companies, 146 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App. 2004), Shaffer was driving a pickup truck owned by her employer. Id. at 691. Shaffer during the accident was not at work for her employer but was with her boyfriend. Id. Following the accident, Shaffer was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated. Id. The court held that Shaffer’s use of the truck while being intoxicated and after office hours, which resulted in collision, was a material deviation from her permitted use of the truck. Id. at 696. In Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Renfrow, 130 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2004), rev’g 90 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App. Ft. Worth 2002), the employee used the company vehicle after work to visit his friend and took her with him to a location which is 40 miles from employer’s office. Id. at 71. The court held that the employee materially deviated from the permission granted by the employer for the use of the company vehicle and was thus not covered under employer’s commercial auto liability policy. Id. at 72.

Knowledge of an agent can be imputed to the principal. Poth v. Small, Craig & Workenthin, L.L.P., 967 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex. App. Austin 1998) citing Wellington Oil Co. v. Maffi, 150 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Texas 1941). It therefore seems reasonable that the dealer’s employees’ knowledge of Phillips’ deviations can be imputed to the dealership. Poth, 967 S.W.2d at 515. A minor deviation such as driving the car in a different direction then the owner’s address, is immaterial for the purpose of insurance coverage. See Coronado, 577 S.W.2d at 529. Moreover, the deviation appears to be “minor” if the actual distance and the time the car was taken was not long enough to term the deviation material. Cf. Tull, 146 S.W.3d 689; Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 130 S.W.3d 70. If an agent drove the car for doing his job and joined with such purpose some private business it would not amount to deviation and the accident would still be covered under insurance policy. See Truck Ins. Exch. 343 S.W.2d at 956.